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Abstract—Typically the cost of a product, a good or a service
has many components. Those components come from different
complex steps in the supply chain of the product from sourcing to
distribution. This economic point of view also takes place in the
determination of goods and services in wireless networks. Indeed,
before transmitting customer data, a network operator has to
lease some frequency range from a spectrum owner and also has
to establish agreements with electricity suppliers. The goal of
this paper is to compare two pricing schemes, namely a power-
based and a flat rate, and give a possible explanation why flat rate
pricing schemes are more common than power based pricing ones
in a deregulated wireless market. We suggest a hierarchical game-
theoretical model of a three level supply chain: the end users, the
service provider and the spectrum owner. The end users intend to
transmit data on a wireless network. The amount of traffic sent
by the end users depends on the available frequency bandwidth
as well as the price they have to pay for their transmission. A
natural question arises for the service provider: how to design an
efficient pricing scheme in order to maximize his profit. Moreover
he has to take into account the lease charge he has to pay to the
spectrum owner and how many frequency bandwidth to rent.
The spectrum owner itself also looks for maximizing its profit
and has to determine the lease price to the service provider.
The equilibrium at each level of our supply chain model are
established and several properties are investigated. In particular,
in the case of a power-based pricing scheme, the service provider
and the spectrum owner tend to share the gross provider profit.
Whereas, considering the flat rate pricing scheme, if the end users
are going to exploit the network intensively, then the tariffs of
the suppliers (spectrum owner and service provider) explode. 1
Index Terms—End user, Service provider, Spectrum owner,
Flat rate pricing scheme, Power based pricing scheme, Pricing
mechanism, Spectrum supply chain, Stackelberg equilibrium
I. INTRODUCTION
Optimal pricing mechanisms have been widely studied in
networking to control the usage of a sparse resource like
frequency bandwidth. In the present work we investigate the
following question: what is the impact of the provider pricing
mechanism on the decision of each agent in a spectrum supply
chain. Often the organization of wireless networks is based on
the interaction among several economic entities. For instance,
end users pay for a given data rate. Service providers have
some costs associated with the wireless network services such
as electricity cost, office renting cost, frequency license, etc.
1This is the last draft version of the paper. Revised version of the paper
accepted by ValueTools 2013 can be found in Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
(ValueTools ’13), December 10-12, 2013, Turin, Italy
As stated in [1], regulation has been traditionally used in
several markets like infrastructure facilities and services. Often
after deregulation there is increased competition that in many
cases benefits consumers. In [1], the author describes the
scope for competition in the major utilities like Electricity,
Gas, Railways, Telecommunications, etc. The author shows
that the competition is feasible and desirable specifically in
telecommunication market. Moreover, in US, collusive be-
haviours, allowing cartel firms, through a distortion of free
market forces, to achieve and share monopolistic profits, are
forbidden and persecuted by (not by chance called) ”anti-
trust” legislations [2]. That is why in our paper we focus on
a deregulation model between the infrastructure provider and
the service provider.
To understand the spectrum supply chain problem, we
propose to model the system as a multilevel economic game
among various agents. Specifically, we consider the following
players; the end users, the service provider and the spectrum
owner. The spectrum owner has the resource, the spectrum
here, and is considered as the top leader in the hierarchy.
The service provider rents a quantity of the resource in order
to propose services to the end users. The multilevel game
approach means that the decision of the spectrum owner is
followed by an optimal decision of the service provider, which
in turns is followed by an optimal decision of the end users.
Depending on the kind of wireless technology used by the
service provider, models of interaction between end users are
different. In a first approach, we consider an interference-free
model where each end user has his own frequency band to
transmit his data. Such kind of phenomenon appears consid-
ering Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
technologies [3]. In an alternative approach, we consider a
noncooperative power control game between the end users
which are interacting together through their signal to inter-
ference and noise ratio (SNR). This second model of inter-
action between the end users corresponds to another wireless
technology like code division multiple access (CDMA) [3].
We focus in this paper on a wireless market in which the
spectrum owner, called also the infrastructure provider, sells
frequency bandwidth to the service provider. This situation
is typical in economic models of Cognitive Radio Networks
[4]. At a lower level of the spectrum supply chain, the
service provider sells services to the end users. The user has
his/her utility function and pays according to the transmission
rate tariff. The service provider can be seen as a Mobile
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2Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) who obtains spectrum
through long-term contracts with spectrum owners or a Mobile
Network Operator (MNO). The MVNO resells the spectrum
to the end users. MVNOs are mobile service offerings from
organizations which typically neither own licensed mobile
spectrum nor operate a physical base station network and
backhaul. Of course, there are exceptions to the rule but the
essential factor is that a MVNO cooperates with a MNO
for network access. MNOs are traditional mobile companies
such as Orange, SingTel and Vodafone [5]. As stated in
[6], [7], it is more efficient for a spectrum owner to hire
a MVNO to serve the end users because the MVNO can
have a better understanding of local population and user’s
demand.Therefore, a natural question arises for the provider:
which tariff the service provider has to assign to obtain the
maximal pure profit, i.e. the difference between how much he
obtains from the end users and how much he has to pay for
the licensed frequency bandwidth to the spectrum owner. The
spectrum owner who rents part of his spectrum to a MVNO, in
turn looks for the frequency bandwidth tariff which can bring
to him maximal profit. We focus in our model on a deregulated
spectrum market where the resource and the services are not
controlled by the same provider, nor by providers which are
colluding.
We would like to note that a Stackelberg game approach
is very popular among researchers dealing with pricing in
networks (see, for example, [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17]). In [7], the authors propose a four stage
Stackelberg model for the study of spectrum market pricing
mechanism with Cognitive MVNO who resells spectrum to
secondary users. The authors show some threshold structure
of the network equilibrium and fair spectrum allocations
to secondary users. The first main difference between the
scenario suggested in the present paper and those mentioned
above is that we deal with three levels hierarchy users-
provider-spectrum owner. Second, we consider different pric-
ing mechanism for the service provider. Finally, we investigate
the impact of the interference model between end users on
the equilibrium. The major contributions of this paper are
described in the following items.
(i) The power-based pricing mechanism implies the
same profit for the service provider and the spectrum
owner.
(ii) The flat rate pricing mechanism induces a higher
profit for the service provider compared to the profit
of the spectrum owner. It gives a possible explanation
to why flat rate pricing schemes are more common
than power based pricing ones.
(iii) A high SINR regime is always desirable in wireless
systems to provide quality of service to the end
users. Then, assuming this property, we get a simpler
closed-form expressions of the equilibrium. Finally,
we obtain that the power-based pricing mechanism,
assuming high SINR, leads to zero profit for the
service provider. Whereas the flat rate pricing mecha-
nism induces non-zero profit for the service provider.
The paper is organized as follows. We present first in section
II, the multilevel economic model with the decision set of each
agent at each level. In section III we give explicit formulations
of the equilibrium in the general wireless context. By assuming
a high SINR regime, in section IV, we obtain a closed-form
equilibrium and conclude saying that the service provider has
to consider the flat rate pricing mechanism instead of the
power-based one, in order to maximize his profit. Finally, in
Section V and Appendix discussions and sketch of proofs for
several theorems are offered.
II. MULTILEVEL HIERARCHICAL PRICING SCHEME
We introduce a multilevel hierarchical game with the follow-
ing decision makers: end users, service providers and spectrum
owners. The system considered in this paper is a particular
multi-level hierarchical supply chain in a wireless network. In
fact we consider first that at the lower level, with the longest
time scale, each end user determines his transmit power in
order to maximize selfishly his utility function. Second, a
service provider, at the middle level and intermediate time
scale, rents some frequencies from the spectrum owner in order
to provide services to the users. Then the service provider
determines optimally the quantity of bandwidth to rent to end
users and the tariff end user should pay for their services.
Third, the spectrum owner, at a longer level and shorter time
scale, manages the spectrum and determines the price of a
unit of bandwidth rent by the service provider. In terms of
timescale, our system considers three different timescales. The
shorter one is the spectrum owner one who decides the tariff
per unit of frequency bandwidth the service provider has to
pay for. In telecommunication market, this timescale can be
like several years. A second longer timescale is the service
provider’s one, which determines the quantity of bandwidth
to rent and the tariff each end users have to pay for their
services. This second timescale is the order of a year. Finally,
the longest timescale is the end users one who choose their
transmit power with a timescale of some months or days or
minutes, depending on the wireless technology used. Note
that this power control management should be implemented
into communication protocols in end-users devices. The main
objective of our model is to study this multilevel supply chain
in wireless telecommunication market, not to necessary obtain
any practical implementation or software, but to understand the
behavior of the different decision makers in such a complex
economic system.
The three-level optimization problem can be described more
formally as follows from the spectrum owner (top-level) to the
end users (low-level).
(i) The spectrum owner maximizes his revenue
vA(W,CW ) = CWW depending on the tariff CW per
unit of frequency bandwidth assigned to the service provider,
i.e.
max
CW
vA(W,CW ) = max
CW
CWW, (1)
where W is the quantity of bandwidth chosen by the servi ce
provider.
(ii) In order to maximize his payoff vP (CP ,W,CW ), the
service provider determines the quantity of bandwidth W to
3license from the spectrum owner and the tariff CP the end
users have to pay for their services i.e.
max
W,CP
vP (CP ,W,CW ) = max
W,CP
{
CP
n∑
i=1
µ(Ti)− CWW
}
, (2)
where the function µ(·) is the pricing scheme used by the
service provider, which depends on user’s i transmission power
Ti and n is the number of end users.
(iii) Finally, each end user i determines his transmission
power Ti in order to maximize his net utility ui(T , CP )
with T = (T1, . . . , Tn) which is the difference between the
throughput and the price imposed by the service provider, i.e.
max
Ti
ui(T , CP ) = max
Ti
{W ln (1 + γi(T ))− CPµ(Ti)} , (3)
where γi(T ) is the signal to noise ratio (SNR) on user’s
i signal. This function determines the quality of the signal
received and then can used to approximate the capacity of a
wireless link with bandwidth W based on the Shannon formula
[18], [19]. This utility function is well-known in the literature
on pricing schemes in wireless systems like in [8].
In order to compute the solutions of this multilevel game, we
use a step-by-step approach from the low-level optimization
problem (the end users) to the high-level one (the spectrum
owner). The solution of this three-level game is a hierarchical
(Stackelberg) equilibrium [20].
In the first step, for a fixed usage tariff CP and bandwidth
W , determined by the service provider, the n users compete
by trying to maximize selfishly their own payoff. We deal here
with a homogeneous network, namely, we assume that all the
users are in the same wireless conditions (so, they have the
same restriction on power and the same fading gains). Each
of them can be considered as an average user. Homogeneous
network suits considering the network where average users
operate and since we try to give an explanation why flat rating
is more common we can restrict ourself to such network. In our
future work we are going to investigate what impact on pricing
schemes different types of user’s groups can produce, say,
employing different applications or have different objectives
[21], [22].
It is natural when studying a power control problem, to
consider that a strategy of a user i is the transmitted power
Ti ∈ [0, T ] with T is the maximal (average) power a user can
apply.
In the second step of the multilevel game, the service
provider, knowing that the end users will act as it was
described in the fist step, chooses for the optimal tariff CP
and how much frequency bandwidth W to license from
the spectrum owner. The service provider payoff vP is the
difference between how much he earns from selling services
to the users and how much he has to pay for the licensed
frequency bandwidth.
In the third step of the multilevel game, the spectrum owner
selects the optimal tariff CW it has to assign to get the maximal
profit.
The aim of the paper is to study this multilevel economic
model with two pricing schemes for the service provider: one
flat rate and the other one power-based. A flat fee, also referred
to as a flat rate or a linear rate, refers to a pricing structure
that charges a single fixed fee for a service, regardless of
usage. Then, the pricing function defined in equation (1) is
µ(x) = 1. For Internet service providers, a flat rate pricing
scheme determines an access to the Internet for all customers
of the telco operator at a fixed tariff. Flat rate is common in
broadband access to the Internet in the USA and many other
countries. In the power-based pricing scheme, we consider
that the profit of the service provider comes from the network
usage and it is proportional to the total power used by all the
end users to send their traffic. Then, our model tends to limit
the power of the end users as they have to pay the provider not
based on the throughput they use but the power they consume.
In this case, the service provider consider uses the following
function µ(Ti) = Ti. Note that introducing power based cost
is common for CDMA [23], [24] and ALOHA networks ([25],
[26]).
III. GENERAL WIRELESS MODEL
We assume a standard wireless communication model as
proposed in [3], where the signal received at the base station
can be written as y = hx + z, where h stands for the block
fading process, x the signal transmitted by the end user and z
is the additive Gaussian noise. We assume coherent communi-
cation such that the fading channel gain is constant over each
block fading length. Moreover, the additive Gaussian noise z
at the receiver is i.i.d circularly symmetric and z ∼ CN (0, σ2).
Two wireless scenarios are considered: interference-free and
interference channel.
A. Interference-free model
We consider the situation where the end users have access
to the network interference from other end users, like in an Or-
thogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) wireless
technology in which each end user has his own transmission
frequency. So, there is no interference between end users since
the service provider supplies different bandwidth frequency for
each end user. Then, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of each
end user i is given by γi = LhTi(W/n)σ2 where Ti is user’s i
transmit power and L is the crosstalk coefficient. We assume
a symmetric system such that all end users have the same
channel gain h. Moreover the service provider shares the
leased bandwidth frequency W equally between the end users.
Then we assume that user i’s utility is given as follows:
ui(Ti) = (W/n) ln
(
1 + LhTi/(Wσ
2/n)
)− CPµ(Ti). (4)
For the flat-rate pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) = 1, it is natural
to assume that each end user is going to consume all the
capacity. Indeed the utility function ui is strictly increasing
depending on Ti. Then, each end user transmits with the
maximal power T . Using this transmission power, each end
user gets a throughput equals to Wn ln
(
1 + LhT(W/n)σ2
)
and has
to pay CP for the service. Then, each end user accepts the
provider’s service if his utility (the difference between the
throughput and the charge) is non-negative. Indeed, there is
no incentive to transmit if his net utility is negative as it is
generally assume in economic models in telecommunication
4TABLE I
THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR INTERFERENCE-FREE MODEL
Power based pricing Flat rate pricing
CW
1
4
≈ 0.468
W nLhT
σ2
≈ 0.462nLhT
σ2
CP
Lh
2σ2
≈ 0.532LhT
σ2
T (T , . . . , T ) (T , . . . , T )
vP
nLhT
4σ2
≈ 0.316nLhT
σ2
vA
nLhT
4σ2
≈ 0.216nLhT
σ2
[27]. Moreover, since the service provider intends to maximize
his profit, then
CP = (W/n) ln
(
1 + LhT/(Wσ2/n)
)
. (5)
We have the first result supplying the solution of the multilevel
supply chain spectrum problem for flat-rate and power based
pricing schemes with interference-free model.
Theorem 1: If there is no interference between end users,
the equilibrium solution of the multilevel economic problem
(CW ,W,CP ,T ) and corresponding payoffs of the service
provider and the spectrum owner are given in Table I.
First, one important remark is that the optimal frequency
bandwidth tariffs CPB−IFW = 0.25 and C
FR−IF
W = 0.468,
for both pricing schemes, do not depend on the number
n of end users nor network’s parameters. Here and below,
upper indexes FR-IF and PB-IF mean flat rate and power
based pricing schemes for the interference-free model cor-
respondingly. Moreover, power-based tariff is almost twice
less CFR−IFW /C
PB−IF
W ≈ 1.87. Considering the power-based
pricing scheme the provider and the spectrum owner share
profit equally vPB−IFA = v
PB−IF
P =
nhLT
4σ2
meanwhile,
with the flat rate pricing scheme, the service provider’s
payoff is essentially greater than the spectrum owner’s one,
i.e. vPB−IFA /v
PB−IF
P = 1.462. Then, using a power-based
pricing scheme, the market is shared equally between the
service provider and the spectrum owner, whereas a flat-rate
pricing scheme makes the service provider’s payoff higher than
the spectrum owner’s payoff. Moreover, the total profit vP+vA
generated for both decision makers, the service provider and
the spectrum owner, is higher with the flat rate pricing scheme,
i.e. 0.532nLhTσ2 , compared to the total profit with the power-
based pricing scheme, i.e. 0.5nLhTσ2 . Finally, surprisingly, each
end user chooses also to transmit using maximum power, even
if a power-based pricing is used by the provider instead of a
flat rate pricing scheme. Thus, we can conclude that from one
hand, in the context of non-interfering end users, a power-
based pricing scheme will not help the spectrum owner to
control the total power consumption of the network but will
permit for him to get more market share and then earn more
revenue from the spectrum rent. From the other hand, the flat
rate pricing scheme is preferable for the service provider since
it brings him higher profit compared to using a power based
pricing scheme which is moreover, more difficult to build in
practice.
B. Interference channels
In this section we consider that the access to the network
is performed considering user’s interference. The signal to
interference and noise ratio (SINR) γi of end user i is given
by
γi(T ) = LhTi
/Wσ2 + h n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Tj
 .
We consider a symmetric system, then the block fading process
is the average one and it is the same for all users. So, the end
user’s i payoff depends on the user action Ti and also on the
actions of the other end users. We denote by T−i the vector
of the actions of all the other players j 6= i. The end user’s i
payoff becomes
ui(T ) =W ln (1 + γi(T ))− CPµ(Ti).
For a fixed usage tariff CP , the vector of end user’s strategies
T ∗ is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if, by definition [20],
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀Ti ∈ [0, T ], ui(T ∗i ,T ∗−i) ≥ ui(Ti,T ∗−i),
where T−i is the vector of all the end users instead user i. We
have the next result supplying the solution of the multilevel
supply chain spectrum problem for flat-rate and power based
pricing schemes with interfering end users. We take into
consideration then the NE between the end users for a given
decision of the service provider and the spectrum owner.
Theorem 2: If there is interference between end users, the
solution of the multilevel economic problem (CW ,W,CP ,T )
and corresponding payoffs vP and vA to the provider and the
spectrum owner are given in Table II.
For the power based pricing scheme in interference model
the optimal frequency bandwidth tariff CW is increasing on
number of users and the quality of network L. Specifically,
this value tends to L/4 when increasing the number of end
users and converges to n/4 when increasing the quality of
network L. Second, we observe also that the demand W at the
equilibrium from the service provider in frequency bandwidth
is increasing depending on the number of end users n to serve.
Finally, the network is over loaded such that the equilibrium
user’s strategies T is to use the maximum power. Then, it
looks like there is some kind of inside cooperative stimulus of
all the participants of the market (they just split the common
profit) who are in charge for network functionality and going
to meet all the user’s demands. We conclude by observing the
utility of each decision maker at the equilibrium.
• The profit of the spectrum owner and the profit of the
service provider coincide at the equilibrium, namely,
vA = vP =
nhLT
4σ2
. Thus, the spectrum owner assigns
the bandwidth frequency tariff in order to withdraw from
the service provider a fixed percent (namely, fifty percent)
of his gross profit.
• For each end user i, the optimal utility is given as follows
ui =
Th
2σ2
(
2(n+ L− 1) ln
(
2
n+ L− 1
2n+ L− 2
)
− L
)
.
5TABLE II
THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR INTERFERENCE CHANNELS MODEL
Power based pricing Flat rate pricing
W
(n+L−1)hT
σ2
W (CW ) = arg maxW<
(
L
exp(CW/n)−1
+1−n
)
hT¯
σ2
(
n ln
(
1 + LhT
Wσ2+h(n−1)T
)
− CW
)
W
CW
nL
4(n+L−1) CW = arg maxCW<n ln(1+L/(n−1)) CWW (CW )
CP
Lh
2σ2
W (CW ) ln
(
1 + LhT
W (CW )σ
2+(n−1)hT
)
T (T , . . . , T ) (T , . . . , T )
vP
nLhT
4σ2
nW (CW ) ln
(
1 + LhT
W (CW )σ
2+(n−1)hT
)
− CW W (CW )
vA
nLhT
4σ2
CW W (CW )
which corresponds the following user’s throughput
R =
Th(n+ L− 1)
σ2
ln
(
2
n+ L− 1
2n+ L− 2
)
.
Thus,(since function f(ξ) = ξ ln(ξ/(ξ−L)) is decreasing
from infinity for ξ ↓ L to L while ξ tends to infinity)
the utility of each end user is strictly decreasing with
n and converges to 0 if n tends to infinity. Moreover,
the throughput of each end user is decreasing with n but
converges to the lower bound ThL/(2σ2). Thus, what-
ever the number of end users is, the throughput of each
end used is lower bounded, meaning that automatically a
best-effort service can be provided.
• Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that the most profitable
pricing scheme for the service provider is the flat rate
pricing scheme when considering end user’s interference.
It allows the spectrum owner to increase bandwidth cost
(and it continuously increasing up to its upper-bound
L/4) While transmission cost even drops down by the
provider a bit for the flat rate pricing scheme, or it
keeps on the same level (Lh/(2σ2)) for power base
pricing scheme. All together it leads to increasing in
the provider’s and spectrum owner’s profits. Increasing
consumption of the maximal power by end-users (which
can be described as increasing intension of using the
network by them) without increasing number of end users
also allows the provider and spectrum owner to increase
their profits, but they manage to get it a bit different way.
The spectrum owner’does not increase the bandwidth cost
for both pricing schemes and gains just due to increasing
demands in bandwidth. Meanwhile the provider to cover
the extra expanses to buy more bandwidth has to lift
up cost in flat rate scheme. In power based pricing
scheme the extra income obtained due to more intensive
using the network by end users allows the provider to
buy more bandwidth for higher price without increasing
transmission cost.
IV. SPECIAL CASE: HIGH SNR REGIME
A particular interesting wireless context is the high SNR
regime, i.e. for each end user i, γi >> 1. This assumption
is always desirable in wireless networks (see [28] for a recent
paper on performance of multiplexing MIMO systems in high-
SNR regime) and leads to the following relation Ti >> Wσ
2
nLh
which gives a lower bound on user’s i transmission power.
Moreover, this assumption has been also proposed in [7] for
the study of an optimal pricing mechanism for spectrum in a
cognitive radio context. This bound is relatively small as the
number of end users n is large and then, this lower bound
is realistic in a wireless network. Thus, assuming high SNR
regime, we have that 1 + γi can be approximated by γi.
Then for the interference-free model, the end user’s i payoff,
assuming high SNR regime, is approximated by the following
expression
ui(T) =
W
n
ln
(
LhTi
(W/n)σ2
)
− CPµi(Ti)
and for the interference user model it is given as follows
ui(T) =W ln
(
LhTi
Wσ2 + h
∑n
j=1,j 6=i Tj
)
− CPµi(Ti).
To deal with high SNR approximation considering the power-
based pricing scheme, we assume that the bandwidth which
the spectrum owner can sell to the service provider is upper-
bounded, namely, that W < W . Then we have the next
result supplying the solution of the multilevel supply chain
spectrum game for flat-rate and power based pricing schemes,
and considering the high SNR assumption.
Theorem 3: Considering high SNR assumption, the equi-
librium of the multilevel economic problem (CW ,W,CP ,T)
and corresponding payoffs vP and vA for the service provider
and the spectrum owner are given in Table III where  is any
enough small positive 1.
It is quite interesting that considering the power-based
pricing scheme, the spectrum owner withdraws all the profit
from the service provider, just leaving him a bit, i.e. W,
to keep working in the business. For the flat rate pricing
scheme, the spectrum owner and the service provider share
the total profit. Also, it is interesting to note that for the
interference-free model at high SNR regime, the spectrum
tariff CFR−IF−HW of the spectrum owner is more than twice
higher than the one in general regime CFR−IFW since
CFR−IF−HW /C
FR−IF
W = 1/0.468 = 2.14.
Meanwhile, when the end users are going to exploit the
network intensively, the tariff applied by the service provider
CFR−IF−HP /C
FR−IF
P = 0.271/0.532 = 0.51
1The function LambertW (.) is the LambertW function satisfying the
equation LambertW(x)eLambertW(x) = x.
6(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 1. (a) The optimal bandwidth W , (b) the optimal bandwidth cost CW , (c) the optimal transmission cost CP and (d) the provider’s and spectrum
owner’s payoffs as functions on number of end users n with L = 400, h = 1, T¯ = 0.5 and σ2 = 10.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2. (a) The optimal bandwidth W , (b) the optimal bandwidth cost CW , (c) the optimal transmission cost CP and (d) the provider’s and spectrum
owner’s payoffs as functions on maximal power T¯ with L = 400, h = 1, n = 40 and σ2 = 10.
TABLE III
THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE MULTILEVEL SPECTRUM GAME IN HIGH SNR REGIME.
Power based Power based Flat rate Flat rate
Interference-free Interference Interference-free Interference
CW 1−  n−  1 nLambertW2
(
n−1
L
e
n+CW
n
)
+ CW = n
W W W ≈ 0.135nLhT
σ2
W = (n−1)hT
σ2
 1
LambertW
(
n−1
L
e
n+CW
n
) − 1

CP W/(Tn) W/T ≈ 0.271LhTσ2 W ln
(
LhT
Wσ2+(n−1)hT
)
vP W W ≈ 0.135nLhTσ2 nW ln
(
LhT
Wσ2+(n−1)hT
)
− CWW
vA W (1− ) W (n− ) ≈ 0.135nLhTσ2 CWW
is reduced two times. The service provider’s payoff reduces
also since
vFR−IF−HP /v
FR−IF
P = 0.135/0.315 = 0.429.
We can conclude this remark by saying that if the service
provider does not control the number of end users and if this
number becomes large, using an OFDM technology the noise
can be very low for each end user and then his SNR very high.
Thus, the provider’s payoff is divided by 2.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied a multilevel economic model
of wireless networks with two pricing schemes: a flat-rate
or a power-based. The different decision makers are the end
users, a service provider and a spectrum owner. The proposed
economic model can be applied in several networking contexts
like cognitive radio network, where a company or an authority
which has the control on the resource (the spectrum here) rents
frequencies to service providers and at the end of this spectrum
supply chain, end users pay for their services to the service
providers. This multilevel model gives interesting results on
how optimal economic relations are built between the different
decision makers. In particular, for the power-based pricing
scheme, the service provider and the spectrum owner split
equally the total market profit. Whereas, considering a flat-rate
pricing scheme it is more profitable for the service provider. Of
course this conclusion should be taken with caution, and that a
more complete model is needed to make stronger conclusions.
In terms of quality of service, the power-based tariff at the
equilibrium depends on the quality of the network and not on
the number of end users. Another important result deals with
the flat-rate pricing scheme. Considering this scheme, if the
end users are going to exploit the network intensively then, it
leads to double increasing of the bandwidth frequency tariff
7by the spectrum owner. It leads also to a bit less than double
increasing of the flat rate tariff to the end users applied by
the service provider. Also, we show that power-based pricing
leads to an equal profit split between spectrum owner and
provider, and that the power-based pricing can lead to the
spectrum owner getting more profit than a flat-pricing scheme
even though flat-pricing is better for extracting the surplus
from the users. In future works, we plan to investigate that
kind of multilevel model for a important new wireless market
by considering Cognitive Radio Networks in which second
hand wireless providers can sell spectrum holes to secondary
users.
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VI. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We consider the flat rate pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) ≡ 1.
Then, the utility of each end users is strictly increasing with
the transmission power T , and thus each end will use the
maximum power T . Moreover, each end-user accepts the
provider’s service if and only if his utility is positive, which
gives the maximum tariff an end-user is able to pay:
CP =
W
n
ln
(
1 +
LhT
(W/n)σ2
)
.
Given this, the provider’s payoff turns into the following
function:
vP (CP ,W,CW ) =W ln
(
1 +
nhTL
Wσ2
)
− CWW.
Note that this function does not depend on CP and:
∂vP
∂W
(CP ,W,CW ) = ln
(
1 +
LhTn
Wσ2
)
− LhTn
LhTn+Wσ2
− CW .
We look now for the optimal quantity of bandwidth the
provider will rent from the spectrum provider depending on
the tariff CW . The optimal frequency bandwidth to lease is
given as follows:
W =W (CW ) := − (LhTn/σ
2)LambertW(−e−1−CW )
1 + LambertW(−e−1−CW ) . (6)
Finally, the spectrum owner’s payoff can be rewritten depend-
ing only on CW as follows:
vA(CW ) = − (LhTn/σ
2)LambertW(−e−1−CW )
1 + LambertW(−e−1−CW ) CW .
Note that the derivative of this function is:
dvA(CW )
dCW
= (LhTn/σ2)LambertW
(
−e−1−CW
)
× CW −
(
1 + LambertW
(−e−1−CW ))2
(1 + LambertW(−e−1−CW ))3 .
So, the optimal bandwidth frequency tariff is given as the root
of the equation
CW −
(
1 + LambertW
(−e−1−CW ))2 = 0.
8and then since CW ≈ 0.468 the result follows for the flat rate
pricing scheme.
We consider the power based pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) ≡ x.
At the first step of the multilevel game, we have to find the
optimal end user strategies. To do so, we first determine the
optimal transmission power of each end user i by computing
the derivative of his utility function:
dui
dTi
(Ti) =
WLh
Wσ2 + LhnTi
− CP .
Thus, the optimal transmission power of user i is Ti =
T (CP ,W ):
T (CP ,W ) =

T , CP ≤ LWh
Wσ2 + LhnT
,
W
n
(
1
CP
− σ
2
Lh
)
, LWh
Wσ2 + LhnT
< CP <
Lh
σ2
,
0, Lh
σ2
≤ CP .
(7)
Now we consider the second step where the provider,
knowing the equilibrium user’s strategies (7) have to decide
which tariff CP to assign and how much bandwidth W to
lease to maximize his revenue. The provider’s payoff at the
second step of the game is given by:
vP (CP ,W ) = −CWW
+

nTCP , CP ≤ LWh
Wσ2 + LhnT
,
W
(
1− σ
2CP
Lh
)
, LWh
Wσ2 + LhnT
< CP <
Lh
σ2
,
0, Lh
σ2
≤ CP .
(8)
Then, the provider’s revenue achieves its maximum value
when the tariff for the users CP is such that
CP = CP (W ) :=
LWh
Wσ2 + LhnT
. (9)
Substituting (9) into (8) leads to the following expression
of the provider’s revenue depending only on the quantity of
bandwidth W to lease:
vP (CP ,W ) = vP (W ) :=
nTLWh
Wσ2 + LhnT
− CWW. (10)
The derivative of this expression depending on W is:
dvP
dW
(W ) =
(LnhT )2(1− CW )− 2LnhTCWW − CWσ4W 2(
Wσ2 + LnhT
)2 .
Then,
(a) if CW ≥ 1 then vP (W ) is decreasing for positive W ,
(b) if CW < 1 then vP (W ) is increasing on the interval(
0, (1−√CW )ThnL/(
√
CWσ
2)
)
and it is decreasing on the
interval
(
(1−√CW )ThnL/(
√
CWσ
2),∞).
Thus, the optimal bandwidth W =W (CW ) which maximizes
the provider’s revenue is given as follows:
W (CW ) =
0, CW ≥ 1,(1−√CW )ThnL√
CWσ
2 , CW < 1.
(11)
Then, at the third and last step of the game, taking into
account (11) the spectrum owner’s payoff is given by
vA(CW ) =
0, CW ≥ 1,√CW (1−√CW )ThnL
σ2
, CW < 1.
Then, the optimal spectrum owner’s strategy maximizing
vA(CW ) is to assign the frequency bandwidth tariff CW =
1/4, and the result follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We consider the flat rate pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) ≡ 1. It is
clear that the end users optimal behaviour is T = (T , . . . , T ).
Then, for the provider, the tariff in order to maximize his
payoff is:
CP = CP (W ) :=W ln
(
1 +
LhT
Wσ2 + h(n− 1)T
)
.
Thus, the provider’s payoff at the NE of the end users
becomes:
vP (CP ,W,CW ) = vP (CP (W ),W,CW ) = nCP −WCW
=
(
n ln
(
1 +
LhT
Wσ2 + h(n− 1)T
)
− CW
)
W.
Then,
argW max vP (CP (W ),W,CW )
= 0, CW ≥ n ln
(
1 + Ln− 1
)
,
> 0, CW < n ln
(
1 + Ln− 1
)
,
and the result follows.
We consider the power based pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) ≡ x.
As usual in hierarchical optimization problems, in order to
compute a solution, we consider the optimization problem
starting from the bottom optimization level (the end users equi-
librium) to the top level optimization problem (the spectrum
owner).
At the first step we have to find the Nash equilibrium of the
non-cooperative power control game between the end users.
The utility function of end user i is given by:
ui(T) =W ln
(
1 +
LhTi
Wσ2 + h
∑n
j=1,j 6=i Tj
)
− CPTi.
In order to obtain the Nash equilibrium, we determine the best-
response strategy of each end user by computing the following
partial derivative:
∂ui
∂Ti
(T) = WLh
Wσ2 + LhTi + h
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Tj
− CP .
Thus, as the game is symmetric, the equilibrium strategy Ti =
T (CP ,W ) for each user i is
T (CP ,W ) =

T , CP ≤ LWh
Wσ2 + (n− 1 + L)hT ,(
Lh
CP
− σ2
)
W
h(n− 1 + L) ,
LWh
Wσ2 + (n− 1 + L)hT < CP
and CP < Lh
σ2
,
0, Lh
σ2
≤ CP .
(12)
At the second step, the provider, knowing the equilibrium
user’s strategies (12), has to determine which tariff CP to
assign and how much bandwidth W to lease in order to
9maximize his revenue. The provider’s payoff at the second
step of the game is given by:
vP (CP ,W ) = −CWW
+

nTCP , CP ≤ LWh
Wσ2 + (n− 1 + L)hT ,(
Lh− σ2CP
)
nW
h(n− 1 + L) ,
LWh
Wσ2 + (n− 1 + L)hT < CP
and CP < Lh
σ2
,
0, Lh
σ2
≤ CP .
(13)
Then, the provider revenue vP (CP ,W ) is continuous and
piece-monotonous on CP such way that
(a) vP (CP ,W ) is increasing for CP ≤ LWhWσ2+(n−1+L)hT ,
(b) vP (CP ,W ) is decreasing for LWhWσ2+(n−1+L)hT < CP <
Lh
σ2 ,
(c) vP (CP ,W ) is constant for Lhσ2 ≤ CP .
Then, the provider revenue achieves its optimum value when
the tariff for the users CP is such that
CP = CP (W ) := LWh/
(
Wσ2 + (n− 1 + L)hT ) . (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) leads to the following expression
of the provider’s revenue depending only on the quantity of
bandwidth W to lease:
vP (W ) := vP (CP (W ),W ) =
nLWhT
Wσ2 + (n− 1 + L)hT − CWW.
(15)
Note that the derivative depending on W of the provider’s
revenue is:
dvP
dW
(W ) =
A2W
2 +A1W +A0
(Wσ2 + h(n+ L− 1)T )2 ,
with
A0 := h
2T
2
(n+ L− 1)(nL− CW (n+ L− 1)),
A1 := −2CWσ2hT (n+ L− 1),
A2 := −CWσ2.
The following equation A2W 2 +A1W +A0 = 0 has the two
roots:
W± = (−CW (n+ L− 1)±
√
CWnL(n+ L− 1)) Th
CWσ2
.
Then we have the following cases:
(a) if CW ≥ nLL+n−1 then vP (W ) is decreasing for
positive W ,
(b) if CW < nLL+n−1 then vP (W ) is increasing for W <
W+ and decreasing for W > W+.
Thus, the optimal bandwidth W =W (CW ) which maximizes
the provider’s revenue is given as follows:
W (CW ) =

0, CW ≥ nLL+ n− 1 ,
(
√
nL−√CWnL(n+ L− 1))
×
√
(n+ L− 1)Th√
CWσ
2 , otherwise.
(16)
Finally, at the third and last step of the game, taking into
account (16), the spectrum owner’s payoff is given by:
vA(CW ) =

0, CW ≥ nLL+ n− 1 ,√
CW (n+ L− 1)Th
σ2
×(√nL−√CWnL(n+ L− 1)), otherwise.
If CW < nLL+ n− 1 we have that
dvA
dCW
(CW ) =
Th
√
n+ L− 1
2σ2
√
CW
(
√
nL− 2
√
CW (n+ L− 1)).
Then, the optimal spectrum owner’s strategy is to assign the
frequency bandwidth tariff CW as follows: CW = nL4(n+L−1)
and the result follows.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We consider the flat rate pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) = 1
in user-free model. Considering the high SNR regime, we can
make the following approximation log(1+γi) = log(γi). Then
the provider’s payoff becomes:
vP (CP ,W,CW ) =W ln
(
LnhT
Wσ2
)
−WCW .
Note that the derivative of the provider’s payoff is:
∂vP
∂W
(CP ,W,CW ) = ln
(
LhnT
Wσ2
)
− 1− CW .
Thus, the optimal frequency bandwidth W =W (CW ) to lease
is
W (CW ) :=
LhnT
σ2e1+CW
.
The spectrum owner’s payoff turns into the following expres-
sion:
vA(CW ) = CWW (CW ) =
LhnTCW
σ2e1+CW
.
Note that the derivative of this function is:
dvA
dCW
(CW ) =
LhnT (1− CW )
σ2e1+CW
.
Then, the optimal bandwidth frequency tariff is CW = 1 and
the optimal quantity of bandwidth rent by the provider is:
W =
LhnT
σ2e2
and the result follows:
We consider the flat rate pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) = 1 in
interference model. Given the approximation of the SINR of
each end users, the provider’s revenue is given by:
vP (CP ,W,CW ) = nW ln
(
LhT
Wσ2 + h(n− 1)T
)
−WCW .
Note that the derivative of this expression depending on the
quantity of bandwidth W is:
∂vP
∂W
(CP ,W,CW ) = n ln
(
LhT
Wσ2 + (n− 1)hT
)
− Wσ
2n
Wσ2 + (n− 1)hT − CW .
Thus, the optimal frequency bandwidth to lease is W =
W (CW ) with
W (CW ) :=
(n− 1)hT
σ2
 1
LambertW
(
n− 1
L
e
n+ CW
n
) − 1
 .
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Given the optimal reaction of the provider, the spectrum
owner’s payoff can be rewritten by:
vA(CW ) =
(n− 1)hT
σ2
 1
LambertW
(
n− 1
L
e
n+ CW
n
) − 1
CW .
We compute the derivative of this function:
dvA(CW )
dCW
=
1− LambertW2
(
n− 1
L e
n+ CW
n
)
− CW
LambertW
(
n− 1
L e
n+ CW
n
)
× (n− 1)hT/σ
2
1 + LambertW
(
n− 1
L e
n+ CW
n
) .
So, the optimal bandwidth frequency tariff is given as the root
of the equation
LambertW2
(
n− 1
L
e
n+ CW
n
)
= 1− CW .
and the result follows.
We consider the power based pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) = x
in interference model. First we have to find the Nash equilib-
rium of the non-cooperative power control game between the
end users. The utility function of end user i is given by:
ui(T ) =W ln
(
LhTi
Wσ2 + h
∑n
j=1,j 6=i Tj
)
− CPTi.
In order to obtain the Nash equilibrium, we determine the best-
response strategy of each end user by computing the following
partial derivative:
∂ui
∂Ti
(T) =
W
Ti
− CP .
Thus, the user’s Nash equilibrium is (T , . . . , T ) and the
optimal tariff is CP = CP (W ) = W/T . Thus, the payoffs
to the provider and spectrum owner turn into vP (W,CW ) =
(n− CW )W , vA(W,CW ) = CWW , and the result follows.
We consider the power based pricing scheme, i.e. µ(x) = x
in user-free model. First we have to find the Nash equilibrium
of the non-cooperative power control game between the end
users. The utility function of end user i is given by:
ui(T) =
W
n
ln
(
nLhTi
Wσ2
)
− CPTi.
In order to obtain the Nash equilibrium, we determine the best-
response strategy of each end user by computing the following
partial derivative:
∂ui
∂Ti
(T) =
W
nTi
− CP .
Thus, the user’s Nash equilibrium is (T , . . . , T ) and the
optimal tariff is CP = CP (W ) = W/T . Thus, the payoffs
to the provider and spectrum owner turn into vP (W,CW ) =
(1−CW )W , vA(W,CW ) = CWW , and the result follows.
